Este trabalho discute as possíveis relações entre a histeria e os chamados distúrbios alimentares que, na atualidade, ganharam um caráter epidêmico. Os discursos dos autores sobre a anorexia e a bulimia são apresentados e organizados em categorias temáticas que abordam as definições de anorexia e bu..

RESUMO O presente artigo pretende restituir o exame ontofenomenológico da ipseidade e da temporalidade em “L’être et le néant” a partir de dois momentos, quais sejam: fenomenologia das três dimensões temporais e ontologia da temporalidade. Este duplo exame não poderá ser pensado sem uma definição prévia do para-si como ipse temporal que falta de... para..., isto é, como ser que, enquanto nada de ser, é uma falta de ser que busca, em vão, preenchê-la. A impossibilidade deste preenchimento, como buscaremos evidenciar, (...) é ontologicamente necessária para que a temporalização do serpara-si não se deixe infestar com a inércia típica do ser-em-si. ABSTRACT The present article intends to restore, from the Sartrean work L'être et le néant, the ontophenomenological examination of ipseity and temporality, understanding this examination in two moments: phenomenology of the three temporal dimensions and ontology of temporality. This double exam could not be thought without a previous definition of for-itself’s as temporal ipseas lack of from… to…, that is, as a for-itself which, while nothingness of being, is a lack of being that constantly seeks to fill it. The impossibility of this fill-up, as we shall see, is ontologically necessary so that the temporality of the being-for-itself does not let itself infest with the typical inertia of the being-in-itself. (shrink)

The starting point of this paper is the idea that linguistic representation is the result of a global process: a process of interaction of a community of cognitive-linguistic agents, with one another and with the environment. I maintain that the study of truth, meaning and related notions should be addressed without losing perspective of this process, and I oppose the ‘static’ or ‘analytic’ approach, which is fundamentally based on our own knowledge of the conventional meaning of words and sentences, and (...) the ability of using them that we have as competent speakers. I argue that the analytic perspective is responsible for five recurring difficulties in truthmaker theory: (1) the lack of attention to the difference of explanatory role between the distinct notions proposed as primary truthbearer; (2) the adscription of purely extra-linguistic truthmakers to ‘synthetic truths’, ignoring the contribution of the linguistic factor; (3) the adscription of purely linguistic truthmakers to ‘logical’ and ‘analytic truths’, ignoring the contribution of the worldly factor; (4) the difficulties in the search for minimal truthmakers; (5) the problems in the treatment of ‘negative facts’ and of other ‘logically complex facts’. I do not provide an account of how to solve these difficulties, but I do show how the ‘process model’ helps to clear up confusion regarding them. (shrink)

The present article is the first of a trilogy of papers, devoted to analysing the influence of semantic Platonism on contemporary philosophy of language. In the present article, I lay out the discussion by contrasting semantic Platonism with two other views of linguistic meaning: the socio-environmental conception of meaning and semantic anti-representationalism. Then, I identify six points in which the impregnation of semantic theory with Platonism can be particularly felt, resulting in shortcomings and inaccuracies of various kinds. These points are (...) the following: the limitations of regarding logico-philosophical analysis as the only working methodology; the tendency to avoid investigating a number of aspects of linguistic meaning; the recurring confusion between sentences, statements, and propositions; the weakness of transcendent assumptions about meaning; the weakness of meaning assumptions adopted on the basis of pure intuition; and inconsistencies caused by some over-eager attempts to escape semantic Platonism. (shrink)

I present a formal ontological theory where the basic building blocks of the world can be either things or events. In any case, the result is a Parmenidean worldview where change is not a global property. What we understand by change manifests as asymmetries in the pattern of the world-lines that constitute 4-dimensional existents. I maintain that such a view is in accord with current scientific knowledge.

The present article is the second part of a trilogy of papers, devoted to analysing the influence of semantic Platonism on contemporary philosophy of language. In Part I (Picazo 2021), the discussion was set out by examining a number of typical traces of Platonism in semantic theory since Frege. In a subsequent paper that shall be published elsewere, additional illustrations of such traces will be provided, taken from a collection of classic texts in the philosophy of language, also from Frege (...) onwards (Baghramian 1998). Then, the present paper is devoted to providing yet additional illustrations of those traces, but this time taken from a collection of recent commissioned essays on the subject: the book Prospects for Meaning, edited by Richard Schantz in 2012. We shall, thus, describe a considerable number of examples in which the influence of semantic Platonism on these essays can be felt. Prominent among these examples are the adhesion to pseudo-Platonism in the form of semantic mentalism; the typical limitations of avoidant and trivializing semantic accounts; the confinement to logico-philosophical analysis as the only methodology for semantic research; the excesses committed by some radical semantic anti-representationalists and some radical semantic biologists; and the adhesion to hardcore semantic Platonism itself. (shrink)

Resumo: Este artigo pretende investigar a maneira pela qual o filósofo francês Jean-Paul Sartre enquadra, em sua psicologia fenomenológica da imaginação, a problemática acerca do irreal normal e do irreal patológico. Estruturando psicofenomenologicamente a atividade da consciência imaginante, será possível ver que a imagem difere radicalmente da percepção, mas ambas permanecem, contudo, consciência intencional. Nessa toada, cabe a indagação: se toda consciência imaginante é consciência intencional, como enquadrar as experiências alucinatórias?: The aim of the present article is to investigate how (...) the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre understood, in his phenomenological psychology of the imagination, the problematic of the "normal unreal" and the "pathological unreal". By psycho-phenomenologically structuring the activity of the imaginative consciousness, we can see that the image differs radically from perception, but both remain intentional consciousness. In this context, it is necessary to ask the following question: if all imaginative consciousness is intentional consciousness, how can we frame hallucinatory experiences? (shrink)

Pretendemos analisar neste artigo o fundamento ontofenomenológico do conhecimento em L’être et le néant. Como veremos, o conhecimento será concebido a partir de uma negação de tipo interna definida como relação ontológica fundamental entre ser-para-si e ser-em-si. Todavia, caso almejemos compreender o estatuto profundo de uma tal relação, teremos que escrutinar as definições sartreanas de ser do fenômeno e fenômeno de ser, ser transfenomenal, ser-em-si, ser-para-si e estrutura reflexo-refletidora do cogito. Recuperando tais definições, mostraremos que a identidade do ser do (...) para-si e do conhecimento, antes de sinalizar que o conhecimento seja a medida do ser, desponta de um registro ontofenomenológico no qual o para-si, enquanto nada de ser, anuncia a si mesmo a partir do em-si. (shrink)

Este artigo visa analisar a categoria do mágico em duas obras fenomenológicas do filósofo francês Jean-Paul Sartre, quais sejam: La transcendance de l’Ego e Esquisse d’une théorie des émotions. Em ambos os textos, o expediente do mágico é recorrente e assinala, por sua vez, uma certa experiência da consciência que poderíamos nomear como anti-fenomenológica. Ademais, este registro do mágico constitui para Sartre um modo, digamos, privilegiado no que tange à análise da ininteligibilidade da relação da consciência com o mundo, com (...) os outros e consigo mesma. (shrink)

O artigo em tela busca apresentar o embate entre, de um lado, a antropologia filosófica de Sartre e, de outro, a antropologia estrutural de Lévi-Strauss. Para esta lida, trazemos à baila o díptico Sartreano Questions de Méthode (1957) e Critique de la Raison dialectique (1960) e a obra levistraussiana La pensée sauvage (1962). Através deste confronto, objetivamos especificar a referida antropologia de Sartre e o modo ela, em pleno “vórtice estrutural”, responde à questão da estrutura.

Greenwood (2019) casts doubts upon whether a certain view about social groups (the view that social groups persist throughout changes in their membership, by virtue of the maintenance of their structure or function) is a fundamental metaphysical truth about social groups, rather than a theoretical truth about some or many social groups. In this note, I introduce a distinction between absolute and relative metaphysics, and argue that there are no 'fundamental metaphysical truths‘ (as Greenwood conceives of them) at all. If (...) there is one thing that should not persist here, it is absolute metaphysics. (shrink)

Two objections are raised against Oliver and Smiley’s analysis of the collective–distributive opposition in their 2016 book: They take it as a basic premise that the collective reading of ‘baked a cake’ corresponds to a predicate different from its distributive reading, and the same applies to all predicate expressions that admit both a collective and a distributive interpretation. At the same time, however, they argue that inflectional forms of the same lexeme reveal a univocity that should be preserved in a (...) formal representation of English. These two assumptions sit uneasily. In developing their analysis, Oliver and Smiley come to the conclusion that even a singular predication such as ‘Tom baked a cake’ must be regarded as ambiguous between a collective and a distributive reading. This is so artificial that it hardly makes sense, and yet there seems to be no way out of the difficulty unless we are prepared to give up the basic premise just mentioned. (shrink)

In this article, I explore the consequences of two commonsensical premises in semantics and epistemology: (1) natural language is a complex system rooted in the communal life of human beings within a given environment; and (2) linguistic knowledge is essentially dependent on natural language. These premises lead me to emphasize the process-socio-environmental character of linguistic meaning and knowledge, from which I proceed to analyse a number of long-standing philosophical problems, attempting to throw new light upon them on these grounds. In (...) particular, I criticize the use of expressions such as ‘absolute truth’, ‘absolute existence’ and ‘the thing in itself’, arguing that they lead to what I call ‘the ultralinguistic paradox’ (a fatal antinomy). In the same way, I review a number of mainstream topics in philosophical semantics, epistemology and metaphysics, reformulating them in terms much more naturalistic – and less mysterious – than usual. (shrink)

In recent decades, plural logic has established itself as a well-respected member of the extensions of first-order classical logic. In the present paper, I draw attention to the fact that among the examples that are commonly given in order to motivate the need for this new logical system, there are some in which the elements of the plurality in question are internally singularized (e.g. ‘Whitehead and Russell wrote Principia Mathematica’), while in others they are not (e.g. ‘Some philosophers wrote Principia (...) Mathematica’). Then, building on previous work, I point to a subsystem of plural logic in which inferences concerning examples of the first type can be adequately dealt with. I notice that such a subsystem (here called ‘discrete plural logic’) is in reality a mere variant of first-order logic as standardly formulated, and highlight the fact that it is axiomatizable while full plural logic is not. Finally, I urge that greater attention be paid to discrete plural logic and that discrete plurals are not used in order to motivate the introduction of full-fledged plural logic—or, at least, not without remarking that they can also be adequately dealt with in a considerably simpler system. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the idiosyncrasy of linguistic competence fosters semantic conceptions in which meanings are taken for granted, such as the one that Quine calls ‘uncritical semantics’ or ‘the myth of the museum’. This is due to the degree of automaticity in the use of language which is needed for fluent conversation. Indeed, fluent conversation requires that we speakers instinctively associate each word or sentence with its meaning (or linguistic use), and instinctively resort to the conceptual repertoire (...) of our language, without calling into question that the meaning of a particular word, or the conceptual repertoire of our language, could have been different than they are. This habit of taking meanings for granted, inherent to our linguistic ability, sometimes interferes with our semantic research, hampering it. In order to illustrate this problem, I pinpoint four places in Quine’s work where, despite his acknowledged analytical rigour, and despite his congenital aversion to the habit of taking meanings for granted, he himself appears to slip into this habit, inadvertently. (shrink)

This paper discusses the reception and the influence of the Critique of Judgement. It focuses on the central distinction between both fundamental types of functions in the Faculty of Judgement: the determinant and the reflexive function; it considers also its projection to the constitution of experience developed in the Critique of Pure Reason.

Apontamentos retóricos sobre o conceito de oração em Teresa d'Ávila: rumo a uma pedagogia mística Resumo: Neste texto apresento algumas reflexões que se constituíram por meio de leituras do pensamento filosófico e religioso de Teresa D’Ávila. Meus objetivos concentram-se em identificar elementos teóricos vinculados à educação do pensamento renascentista-moderno na Espanha. Dentre os conceitos investigados, ressalto a relação entre ensino, oração e praxis no discurso cristão, inferindo, neste contexto, sobre a possibilidade de uma pedagogia teresiana. O foco de minha análise (...) repousa na obra Castelo interior, a qual, do ponto de vista retórico, configura-se como um relato da experiência vivida pela autora. Tal fato leva-me a refletir os escritos da monja carmelita como um certo tipo de ensino, fundado na experiência mística. Assim, a estrutura do conceito de oração em Teresa desvela-se em uma prática de meditação que gera e impulsiona o conhecimento de si e para o outro. A oração, então, pode ser apreendida tal como qualquer outro tipo de instrução (técnica), por meio de etapas (método), e apresentando um resultado: a união entre a alma e Deus. Dessa união resulta um tipo subjetivo de conhecimento, a saber: o conhecimento místico. Palavras chaves: oração; técnica; ensino; retórica; conhecimento. Rhetorical notes on the concept of prayer in Teresa of Ávila: towards a mystical pedagogy Abstract: In this paper, I present some reflections resulting from readings on Teresa of Ávila philosophical and religious thought. My objectives are focused on identifying theoretical elements that are linked to education in the Renaissance Modern thought in Spain. Among the concepts investigated, I highlight the relationship between teaching, prayer and praxis in Christian discourse, inferring, in this context, the existence of a Teresian pedagogy. The focus of my analysis is on Interior castle, which, from a rhetorical point of view, is configured as an account of the experience lived by the author. This fact leads me to reflect on the writings of the Carmelite nun as a certain type of teaching, based on mystical experience. Thus, the structure of the concept of prayer in Teresa is revealed in a meditation practice that generates and impels knowledge of oneself and for the other. Prayer, then, can be apprehended just like any other kind of instruction (technique), through stages (method), and presenting a result: the union between the soul and God (mystical knowledge). From this union results a subjective type of knowledge, namely: mystical knowledge. Key-words: prayer; technique; teaching, rhetoric; knowledge. Note retoriche sul concetto preghiera in pensiero teresiano: verso uma pedagogia mistica Astratto: In questo testo presentiamo alcune riflessioni che sono state costituite attraverso letture del pensiero filosofico e religioso di Teresa de Ávila. Nostri obiettivi sono focalizzati sull'individuazione di elementi teorici legati all'educazione del pensiero medievale. Tra i concetti indagati, si evidenzia il rapporto tra insegnamento, preghiera e prassi nel discorso cristiano, inferendo, in questo contesto, la possibilità di una pedagogia teresiana. Il fulcro della nostra analisi poggia sull'opera Castelo interior, che, da un punto di vista retorico, si configura come racconto dell'esperienza vissuta dall'autore. Questo fatto ci porta a riflettere gli scritti della monaca carmelitana come un certo tipo di insegnamento, basato sull'esperienza mistica. Così, la struttura del concetto di preghiera in Teresa si rivela in una pratica meditativa che genera e spinge alla conoscenza di sé e per l'altro. La preghiera, quindi, può essere appresa proprio come qualsiasi altro tipo di istruzione (tecnica), attraverso passaggi (metodo), e presentando un risultato finale: l'unione tra l'anima e Dio (conoscenza mistica). Parola chiave: preghiera; técnica; insgnamento; retorica; conoscenza. Data de registro: 19/02/2021 Data de aceite: 20/10/2021. (shrink)

Can a planetary anthropology cope with both the "provincial cosmopolitanism" of alternative anthropologies and the "metropolitan provincialism" of hegemonic schools? How might the resulting "world anthropologies" challenge the current panorama in which certain allegedly national anthropological traditions have more paradigmatic weight--and hence more power--than others? Critically examining the international dissemination of anthropology within and across national power fields, contributors address these questions and many others.

El liberalismo de Carlos S. Nino evolucionó desde sus primeros trabajos vinculados al derecho penal, hacia la construcción de una teoría de la democracia deliberativa. Desde sus comienzos, siguiendo a los autores liberales clásicos como John Stuart Mill, hasta el final en donde adhirió a un liberalismo igualitario, hubo construcciones que acompañaron este proceso, como el concepto de autonomía personal, y también ciertos ideales morales, como un oposición concreta al perfeccionismo. El texto presenta al liberalismo de Nino al comienzo y (...) al final de su obra para mostrar que el antiperfeccionismo originado en el liberalismo clásico que servía de base para construir su concepción de la autonomía, se mantuvo inalterado durante todo este proceso de evolución dificultando la compatibilización de su teoría de la responsabilidad penal con su teoría de la democracia deliberativa, orientada hacia el liberalismo igualitario. (shrink)

Con el recibo del agua llegó un cartón impreso y plastificado, en cuyo interior estaba adherida una cápsula verde, de esas de material digerible en que suelen venir los antibióticos. El cartón promocionaba “la nueva maravilla” que traía la cápsula: Dream Peace (la paz soñada).Dream Peace, de acuerdo con la propaganda, pone en nuestras manos “secretos pertenecientes a antiguas culturas milenarias” y sirve, entre otras muchas virtudes, para combatir el stress, mejorar la concentración, agudizar..

Resumo O objetivo principal do presente estudo é identificar o tempo como o critério de verificação da possibilidade de um discurso filosófico, isto é, de uma possibilidade discursiva ser capaz de falar adequadamente acerca das palavras fundamentais. Para tanto, interessará mostrar como o tempo é o elemento vinculador das condições de possibilidade do enunciado em geral e como este se fundamenta na estrutura imprópria da temporalidade. Tal prerrogativa é o que inviabiliza o enunciado tratar adequadamente qualquer palavra fundamental. Caberá, então, (...) afirmar que somente uma possibilidade discursiva que se fundamente na estrutura própria da temporalidade poderá ter um acesso adequado às palavras fundamentais.The main objective of the present study is to identify time as the criterion of verification of the possibility of a philosophical discourse, that is, of a discursive possibility to be able to speak adequately about the fundamental words. For this, it will be interesting to show how time is the linking element of the conditions of possibility of the statement in general and how it is based on the improper structure of temporality. Such prerogative is what makes the predication impossible to adequately treat any fundamental word. It must then be said that only a discursive possibility based on the structure of temporality can have adequate access to the fundamental words. (shrink)

The present study aims to understand how temporality is the condition of possibility of that understanding-of-being which understands beings as present-at-hand. To do so, we will try to present an outline of the structure of temporality developed by Heidegger in Being and Time and in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. The exposition of such a structure will then allow us to show how presentness—and therefore the entity that has this mode of being—can only come to the fore in a present.

Se presenta un breve análisis comparativo del lenguaje religioso y el lenguaje científico.

Ofrezco una justificación breve del valor de la actividad científica y una vindicación de su defensa.

Las teorías que usamos para representar el mundo pueden ser extremadamente complejas. Abordan temas tales como electrones, campos cuánticos, estrellas de neutrones, materia oscura, redes neuronales, mercados económicos, la atmósfera y muchas otras entidades que suponemos existen en el universo. Al formular nuestras teorías, recurrimos a lenguajes exactos que nos permiten minimizar la vaguedad y expresarnos lo más precisa y cuantitativamente posible. Recurrimos a la matemática. Cuando formulamos nuestras teorías fácticas en lenguaje matemático, estas se refieren no solamente a objetos (...) que nosotros interpretamos como materiales, tales como partículas o personas, sino también a entidades más raras de un mundo abstracto: conjuntos, números, funciones, espacios algebraicos, variedades, topologías, y otras entidades similares. Estos objetos no son materiales en el sentido en que nosotros decimos que una manzana es material. Ellos no existen en el espacio-tiempo, no interactúan, no cambian o evolucionan. Sin embargo, allí están, profundamente arraigados en nuestras teorías más apreciadas acerca del mundo. (shrink)

El artículo elabora un itinerario del lugar que tiene la muerte en el trabajo de Foucault. Para ello revisa y discute algunos de sus principales antecedentes como son las figuras de Bichat y Canguilhem. El problema de la muerte está atravesado por una serie de discusiones en torno a la vida tal y como la han desarrollado las ciencias de la vida durante la modernidad.

Esta bibliograf a compila la extensa obra publicada de Leopoldo Zea: monograf as, cap tulos en libros, art culos period sticos y pr logos e introducciones. Incluye tambi n una bibliograf a sobre Zea.

En este trabajo nos proponemos elucidar el concepto de bíos desarrollado por Foucault en su curso recientemente publicado, Subjectivité et vérité,estableciendo su desarrollo luego con la noción de "vida bella" presentada en su Historia de la sexualidad, para finalmente analizar un tipo específico de bíos, el de los cínicos, que transita entre la crudeza de la parresía y la animalidad.